Adam Ingram: Work on the future carrier programme is continuing, and we remain committed to providing this quantum step up in the military capability for our armed forces.

Adam Ingram: We could trade history, but we need to go back only to the 1990s to recall the cuts that the then Conservative Government imposed. Regiments were amalgamated, the naval fleet was reduced, the number of submarines was reduced, the number of frigates fell, naval personnel numbers were cut, and, during the 1992–1997 Tory Government, the number of RAF squadrons fell by 15 per cent. So the one thing that I will not do is take lectures from the Conservatives. I do not think that the 1930s—

Hon. Members: Answer!

Brian Jenkins: My right hon. Friend will realise that I have no constituency interest in this question, as we do not build aircraft carriers in Tamworth. Will the Minister give us an assurance, however, that when we go out to tender, all the players involved will still be in existence? We need to ensure that any contractor that is picked to build the new carriers is able to remain in existence, given that, without any continuity of programme, it might have been unable to keep together its skilled manpower. What is the Minister doing to ensure that those manufacturers will be given a date towards which they can plan? At present, they do not have any such assurance.

Adam Ingram: First, I ask the hon. Gentleman to check his figures, as I think that he is doing a bit of double-counting. We have tried at all times to ensure the accuracy of figures, and I think that he has added figures so that what was counted as part of the original project cost has come out as an increased cost. I cannot give the precise figures for that project off the top of my head, but I will certainly write to him so that he is aware of all the relevant parliamentary questions relating to costs. If he is saying, like his hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Peter Viggers) who is not in his place, that he wants to see Swan Hunter closed, he should just come out and say that, because that would not go down well in the north-east.

Gordon Prentice: I do not look like him.
	The Prime Minister famously said back in May that he wanted to listen to the views of Members and I think that there should be an informed debate on this issue. Can I ask my Friend on the Front Bench if those five full-timers would turn their attention to drafting a Green Paper setting out the options that the House can consider?

Point of Order

Eric Forth: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Are you satisfied that the Serjeant has adequate powers to deal with Members when allegations are made about this or that violation of allowances? You will realise, Mr. Speaker, that it puts any Officer of the House in a difficult position when they are asked to discipline or reprimand a Member. Are you satisfied that the Serjeant, who you have identified as responsible for this matter, has all the powers that he needs to ensure that there is no abuse of postage or of other allowances?

Humfrey Malins: We begin our deliberations with a discussion on the vexed but important issue of being able to search children to ascertain whether they are carrying weapons upon them. The Government have introduced a new clause. In effect, it extends the right to search to those who are undergoing further or higher education. As for new clauses 9 and 8, my hon. Friends and I will undoubtedly accept that there is sense in what is proposed.
	I shall speak briefly to amendments Nos. 22, 26 and 27, all of which are in my name and the names of my hon. Friends. At the same time, I shall comment on some of the Government amendments that are before us.
	Amendment No. 22 relates to clause 1 and the issue of whether a member of staff should have reasonable grounds for believing that a pupil may have a weapon with him or her. My amendment would leave out the words "reasonable grounds for believing" and insert "believes". We believe that a fairly tough and vigorous approach should be taken to the entire issue of knives and other weapons being carried by school children. The purpose of inserting "believes" instead of "reasonable grounds for believing" is to strengthen the position of the member of staff concerned before a search takes place, and not to put too great a burden on the teacher. If it is the case that the member of staff has to have reasonable grounds to believe, he or she may be expected to go through some sort of mental gymnastics before concluding that it would be right to search the child—for example, "What grounds do I have? Are they reasonable? Would they be open to challenge later?" We are very used nowadays to children being able to challenge members of staff. I want to put that person in a slightly stronger position so that they could perhaps avoid unnecessary challenges in due course.
	The Minister, who is not happy with my amendment, talks about pupil protection and the need to ensure that trust is not damaged. However, we are dealing with a serious problem. In a sense, I want to give members of staff stronger powers to do what they think is right even if, from time to time, the grounds on which they want to search someone may not always be deemed to be reasonable by outsiders.
	For example, what is the position of a member of staff when a pupil comes up to them and says, "I think that so and so may be carrying a weapon"? Is that a reasonable ground for a search? What about a member of staff who overhears one pupil talking to another about carrying weapons? Would that amount to a reasonable ground? What about a bulge, for example, where a knife might be kept in a young man's trousers? Would that amount to a reason for a member of staff saying, "I think that there may be a ground for a search. I believe that there may be a knife there. I am going to search." That decision would be reached without having to examine the whole issue of reasonable ground.
	The purpose of amendment No. 22 is to strengthen the position of the teacher rather than to weaken it.

Humfrey Malins: I am grateful to my hon. Friend who raises the important issue of apparel—for want of a better description—that might be important to someone in relation to their religious beliefs. He is right to say that the House should be sensitive to such issues, which are very important to some members of our community. It is not unknown for members of certain religions to carry small knives, but I have to say to my hon. Friend that I cannot immediately form a decisive view on that issue except to say that it is an offence under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to carry a bladed article in a public place. All of us would wish to ensure that the law was properly upheld and enforced in that respect.
	The new clause deals with the power to search school pupils for weapons. It is not appropriate for the Government to introduce this clause as a flagship proposal to address the problem of knives in schools. As with so much of the law, it is a question of properly enforcing the existing laws of the land. For example, it is already an offence under section 139A of the Criminal Justice Act for a person to have a bladed article on school premises. Furthermore, under section 139B, a constable already has a power to enter school premises to search them and any person on them for any article to which that section applies. Tens of thousands of schoolchildren are carrying knives on school premises, disguised in their clothing, and it distresses me that the existing law as laid out in section 139 is not properly enforced.
	I asked the Minister some weeks ago if she could provide figures for the number of occasions on which a constable has entered school premises to conduct a search of a school pupil. The Minister was not able to tell us how many times that has happened. I asked the Minister in a written question a little earlier in the year about the current powers of head teachers to search and suspend pupils whom they suspect of carrying a form of weapon. The Minister replied that state and independent school head teachers may search a desk or locker without the pupil's consent, search a bag or jacket with consent or ask the police to do a personal search.
	We think that we have a problem with young people carrying knives, but it is now critical and needs to be addressed seriously. A Youth Justice Board survey last year showed that 1 per cent. of pupils aged 11 to 16 has, at some time in the previous year, carried a knife in school for offensive reasons, and 2 per cent. had done so for defensive reasons. I checked with the Library the number of schoolchildren of that age in the state sector, and it is more than 3.5 million. Even if one chooses a smaller number of children, if 1 per cent. of children carry a knife for offensive purposes, it means that more than 20,000 children are carrying knives in schools for offensive purposes. If 2 per cent. do so for so-called defensive purposes, it means that more than 40,000 children aged between 11 and 16 are—according to the Government's figures—carrying knives for defensive reasons. It is a horrible statistic: 60,000 children are carrying knives in our schools, yet what is the prospect of their being charged or prosecuted for that offence under existing law? We need only look at the figures.
	Over the last few years, how many of the 60,000 children who, according to the Government's figures, were carrying knives, were charged with and convicted of having a bladed article on school premises? In the past five years, fewer than 100 children were charged with that offence, and of those sentenced only nine received a custodial sentence. That is an astonishing statistic, which means that carrying—

Humfrey Malins: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, and also for his contribution in Committee. As he rightly says, there is no point in giving teachers those powers unless there is some result from their being used in practice. That is why I was illustrating that the Government's track record to date is so abysmal. The offence of carrying a knife on school premises already exists, but there is only one chance in 2,500 of a pupil being prosecuted for such an offence under existing law and only one chance in eight that any of those prosecuted will be sent to prison. The situation is terrifying.
	It is all very well for the Government to bring forward a so-called flagship policy of searching children for knives and giving head teachers the powers to do so, but the Government should be deeply ashamed of the fact that knife carrying in schools has risen so dramatically over the past few years, causing so much fear to so many people, yet it is under-prosecuted by the authorities. The culture of the blade is indeed with us.
	In Committee, I briefly raised with the Minister a particular case relating to search and I want to raise it again today. Some weeks ago, Opposition Members were horrified to read a newspaper report that a council was forced to pay £11,000 to a boy expelled for taking a knife to school. Apparently, the council was ordered to apologise to the teenager and to pay his mother £5,000 compensation for anxiety and uncertainty, plus £6,000 for home tuition for her son. Not surprisingly, teachers reacted with fury. If that is what happens when somebody is expelled from school, it is a very sorry situation.
	Carrying a knife in school is a serious matter that should result in prosecution of the child, yet the reality is, as my figures show, that it is simply not happening. To return to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright) made a few moments ago, it is almost a waste of time giving the Government further powers if they do not use their existing powers properly. My general proposition is that although there are more than 60,000 offences a year of carrying a knife in school, the number actually being taken to court is paltry in the extreme.

Michael Connarty: The hon. Gentleman referred to a newspaper article but drew the wrong conclusion. He did not tell us who was the author of the decision. If the power to expel a pupil exists and someone—not the pupil or the Government but, presumably, someone in a judicial position—made a judgement to overturn the initial decision, I do not understand why the blame should lie with the Government who gave those powers or with those who used them.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, but I lay the example before the House this afternoon so that it can understand that knives in school are a serious problem and to tell the House that I for one—I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would take the same view—believe that giving compensation to a mother and son for distress in a case involving the carrying of a knife is a very sorry situation indeed. I accept the point that he makes; but, nevertheless, I want to ask the Minister whether she will be kind enough to comment on that case—she did not do so in Committee—and say how it squares with Government policy. That concludes my remarks on my amendments.
	We find no reason to challenge the Government amendments, certainly not those in this grouping. Searches by a second member of staff is an important issue, and I very much hope that—if not today, certainly when the Bill reaches another place—the Government will introduce a suitable amendment to give the duty to a second member of staff. I appreciate what the Minister has said about clothing—she has toughened up that clause—but none of this will count for anything in life unless it is acted on.
	I stress that, if we are giving this power to teachers, it is absolutely vital that education authorities and teachers get to grips with the problem of the knife culture in school, which is currently almost out of control, and use, as well as the power to search pupils, the existing criminal law, which is ready to be enforced. It is simply not right that a handful of charges have been brought under the existing law. A much stronger enforcement of current legislation is needed.
	I wish the clause good luck, and I wish the teachers who have to enforce it good luck and good fortune in the very difficult task that they have to carry out, but my final wish is that the culture of the blade, which dominates our schools at the moment, can as quickly as possible be stamped out by whatever means are necessary.

Lynne Featherstone: I rise to speak to new clause 8, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, which hon. Members may notice is not a million miles in difference from Government new clause 9. I very much welcome the Government's tabling of that clause, because it acknowledges the concern that we expressed about not giving further education colleges an equivalent power, thus sending out a worrying signal that only school pupils need protection and possibly even giving the impression that colleges are a soft touch. More 16 to 18-year-olds in full-time education attend further education colleges and sixth form colleges than schools—701,000, compared with 345,000—and 120,000 14 to 16-year-olds choose to study vocational courses at college. So we very much welcome those powers being extended to teachers and head teachers at further education colleges.
	On amendment No. 22, tabled by the Conservatives, I find myself in agreement with the Government, as there is more protection and greater safeguard in having reasonable grounds, rather than in simply believing. However, I welcome amendment No. 27 and the Government's response, in which the second person might be a member of staff. That is an intelligent and probably better way forward. The extra clarification about the definition of outer clothing can only be helpful—the more definition, the better.
	I shall not extend my remarks interminably, but I wish to comment on the assertion of the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) that 60,000 children are carrying knives. If that figure is correct, would 60,000 prosecutions really be the answer? I would prefer those children to be searched by their head teachers and staff, because that would be a more personal and connected way of addressing the matter.

Sammy Wilson: Does the hon. Lady accept that it might take only some token prosecutions before those carrying knives at school learned that would be a penalty for that? There would thus be no requirement for 60,000 prosecutions.

Hazel Blears: Having a blade on school premises is an offence, and any other material that could provide evidence of that offence could be seized. If an individual was even contemplating using any other pointed articles, those items could be seized and confiscated as a result of the search. Schools and teachers will have the necessary powers to be able to take potential weapons away from people, which ought to make our school premises significantly safer in future.
	The hon. Member for Woking raised the case of someone who was excluded from school. I should put on the record the fact that compensation, as I understand it, was awarded because of the failure to provide alternative education provision rather than anything to do with the seizure of the knife. Schools obviously have powers not just to conduct searches under the legislation but to exclude pupils for violent activity, including the carrying of knives on the premises. We would certainly support teachers and head teachers who take such action to exclude pupils, but the compensation in the case mentioned by the hon. Gentleman was payable, I believe, for the failure to provide education provision rather than because of the initial decision to exclude. We would not want teachers to shy away from exclusion in such circumstances.
	The hon. Gentleman spoke about the importance of schools and the police working together closely, and I can confirm that police officers are stationed in 400 schools across the country, where they can build extremely good relationships with both teachers and pupils. Police officers who are based full time in schools have had a significant impact on the likelihood of violent incidents occurring in school. They can often nip problems in the bud, and do excellent educational work with pupils to show them that the carrying of knives and other weapons is not the way to resolve conflict. Basing police officers in schools is therefore an extremely good idea.

Hazel Blears: If there is evidence of offences that have been committed, the police would take the action that they usually take in those circumstances. We have introduced powers for searches for alcohol and tobacco in the possession of underage youngsters, as well as for other substances. If the police found illegal substances they would retain them and dispose of them in the normal manner, just as they would for anyone else who had committed an offence. The age of criminal responsibility in this country is 10, and if people are found to have committed criminal offences the police will take appropriate action as a result of the evidence that they find.

Humfrey Malins: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, that is not right. Both of those orders must be made by a court upon the production of evidence that satisfies the court that the appropriate order should be made.
	A third reason why an antisocial behaviour order could be more appropriate than a drinking banning order is the consequences of a breach. As I understand it, the penalty for a breach of a drink banning order is not the highest. Under clause 10—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—a person who is the subject of a drink banning order is guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine: not a fine or imprisonment, but just a fine. The clause imposes a drink banning order and effectively says to the person who is its subject: "Breach this order and the result will be a fine", whereas the breach of an antisocial behaviour order can, and often does, result in a custodial sentence, and rightly so.
	Let me illustrate further my proposition that existing law deals with problems of the sort that the Minister is trying to deal with. Some months ago, I asked her what powers courts have to ban defendants from entering licensed premises—because, let us make no mistake about it, that is what the drink banning order purports to do. She replied:
	"Under the provisions of the Licensed Premises (Exclusion of Certain Persons) Act 1980 a court can make an order prohibiting a person from entering specified licensed premises, following conviction for an offence committed on licensed premises involving violence or threats of violence."
	The power already exists. Undoubtedly a great number of orders should have been made under the 1980 Act, but how many have been made? The Minister went on to say that
	"antisocial behaviour orders . . . introduced under . . . the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and first used in 1999 can also be used to prohibit certain people from entering certain specific areas or premises."—[Official Report, 12 July 2005; Vol. 436, c. 908W.]
	If an antisocial behaviour order that carries a custodial sentence in the event of a breach can be used to prevent certain persons from entering certain areas or premises, what does a drink banning order add, if anything, to the existing law?
	We suffer from a surfeit of laws. The House of Commons passes law after law, and the trouble is that they pile up and fall into disrepute, and quite often existing legislation that is perfectly fit for purpose are not properly used.

Humfrey Malins: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Such situations are becoming increasingly common. As we all know, in their early years antisocial behaviour orders were barely used at all. I remember the then Home Secretary telling the Home Affairs Committee that he thought that thousands would be used in the first year or two, but such is the bureaucratic nightmare involved that only a few hundred were used in that period. The use of antisocial behaviour orders has increased a lot in the past couple of years, and I congratulate the Government and the courts on that. There is always a very slow run-in period before such orders are used to their full effect. It could properly be said that antisocial behaviour orders are now the norm rather than the exception in such cases, and breaches usually result in a custodial sentence. So his parallel point about the drinking banning order, which, according to the Government, we need to cure an immediate problem quickly, is correct. If the antisocial behaviour order is anything to go by, it will be years before the drinking banning orders get under way and are used to their full effect.
	What problems do the drinking banning orders purport to attack? The answer is the alcohol-fuelled disorder, to which I referred earlier. No hon. Member doubts that one of the greatest problems that the country faces is binge drinking, especially by young people, both girls and boys. The Prime Minister's strategy unit's alcohol harm reduction project was established a year or two ago. It told us—we knew it already—that British teenagers, along with those in Ireland and Denmark, are among the heaviest teenage drinkers in Europe. They are more likely to drink to get drunk and to report problems that are associated with drinking than their counterparts in other European countries.
	There is a telling statistic: more than one third of 15-year-olds in the United Kingdom report having been drunk at the age of 13 or earlier. That is a desperate figure. Given that an antisocial behaviour order can be made against someone as young as 10, the problem of young person's drunkenness could be better addressed through such an order.
	Patterns of heavy and binge drinking, which are especially serious in the UK, lead to an increasing toll of premature death and health problems as well as alcohol-related disorder and injuries.One of the most distressing factors is the number of women who drink well above recommended guidelines. That figure has risen by more than half in the past 15 years. Hon. Members will agree that binge drinking by young women is perhaps even more dangerous in health terms than that by young men.
	We face big problems and binge drinking is undoubtedly one of them. Come with me, Mr. Speaker, to the streets of some of our towns and cities in the south on a Friday and Saturday evening, and see what happens when people, full of alcohol, are turned out of pubs and clubs at 11 pm or 12 am. It was probably different in our day—I say that as a kindness to all hon. Members—when there was no such thing as spirit chasers. In my experience in the courts, I have encountered many young people who commit alcohol-fuelled crime, who, in between their pints of bitter, have a double vodka or a double spirit shot. That is a relatively new and damaging trend which must be tackled.

Humfrey Malins: The Government continually argue that the new licensing laws will lead to a continental café culture, whereby everybody comes out of the clubs and behaves beautifully. However, the hon. Gentleman is na-ve if he believes that extended licensing hours will help. I understand that the Government always support the police and, if the police say something, the Government appear to believe that it must be right. The police have said that they are terribly worried about late drinking hours and the Judges Council has made a statement to the effect that alcohol consumption over a longer period of time—the extended licensing hours—is much more likely to fuel alcohol-related crime. I therefore urge the Government, even at this late stage, to think again, given that so many people are against them on permitting alcohol to be drunk round the clock.
	The problems of alcohol-related disorder are clearly there for all to see, but there is already a range of offences and orders to cover everything that happens on our streets in relation to drunkenness and drunken crime, and according to the Home Affairs Committee, which is dominated by Labour Members, those powers are grossly underused at present. So what is the point of introducing a new Bill with a complicated new kind of order when the existing law is wholly adequate?
	The whole issue is about the proper enforcement of those existing laws, and I shall give the House some examples. If a person is drunk, there is an offence of simple drunk. If they are drunk and disorderly, there is an offence of drunk and disorderly. It is interesting to speculate on the number of people who are prosecuted for being drunk or drunk and disorderly. In truth, the numbers are dropping dramatically, yet there is more drunkenness and disorderliness on our streets. Why, then, have the prosecutions dropped from about 124,000 in 1980 to fewer than 44,000 in 2001? I suspect that the Government would answer that most offences of drunk and disorderly are dealt with by issuing fixed penalty notices. That can sometimes send the wrong signal, however, because some people deserve to appear in court.
	When we referred to fixed penalty notices at the Standing Committee's second sitting, I remember the Minister saying:
	"From January to August of this year, 86,000 fixed penalty notices were issued across the country".
	When I asked her how many had been paid, she replied:
	"Something like three quarters: 50 per cent. straight away and 25 per cent. after a little delay".—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 18 October 2005; c. 63.]
	I then referred the Minister to a written question that I had put to her Department in June this year. I had asked for the total value of fixed penalty notices handed out by the police in the Greater London area in the past 12 months, and the percentage that remained unrecovered. One would have thought that the Minister's answer to that question would have been the same as the one that she gave in Committee. However, her answer was that the total value of fixed penalty notices issued was not collected centrally. So, in fact, she was able to tell us very little about the effectiveness of fixed penalty notices.
	Apart from the offences of drunk and drunk and disorderly, there are the offences of common assault and actual bodily harm, as well as four or five offences under the Public Order Act 1986, ranging from riot right down to using abusive words and behaviour. And so the list goes on. Offence after offence can and should be used by the Government but they are simply not being used at the moment.
	Antisocial behaviour orders are the subject of new clause 1, and I believe that changing the time for which they operate from a minimum of two years to three months could fit the bill. I want to ask the Minister some specific questions. Does she accept that an antisocial behaviour order can prohibit persons from entering specific areas or premises? Does she also accept that such an order could prevent a person from entering a licensed premises? She must accept that the answer is yes to both those questions. Will she therefore tell me how many such orders forbidding persons to enter such licensed premises have been made so far by the courts? How many have been breached? How effective have they been? How many people have been sent to prison—as is possible under an ASBO but not under a drink banning order—for such breaches? Will she also confirm that another restriction that can be laid upon an individual is, before trial, to impose bail conditions forbidding a defendant from going into specified premises.
	The Minister has said that antisocial behaviour orders are not appropriate for dealing with alcohol-related disorder. May I gently suggest to her that she is completely out of step with the courts, which, I can tell her from my own experience, are using ASBOs to deal with exactly the sort of alcohol-related disorder that we are facing? I repeat the point that they are stronger than drink banning orders, simply because the penalty for breach can be up to five years in prison—I will be corrected if I am wrong—whereas the penalty for breach of this drink banning order is only a fine. That troubles me, because if the breach only results in a fine, our means courts will be flooded with cases of people who have a drink banning order made against them, who breach it, and who do not pay the fine, which is the maximum sanction. That is the reality. If you and I were to know, Mr. Deputy Speaker—I knew at one point—the percentage of unpaid fines in the Greater London area in a particular year, we would be absolutely astonished at the volume of them.
	The question of breach is important. The Minister said, during the Committee's third sitting, I think, on 18 October, that custody is not appropriate if people have merely breached a community penalty. I happen to take a different view, and I wonder where she has been all this time—in fact, in courts up and down the land, breaches of community penalty often result in a custodial sentence, not least for the original offence.
	I want to speak briefly to some other important amendments. The purpose of new clause 1 and amendment No. 1 is my fundamental one of saying that the proposed legislation is unnecessary and that the problems addressed can be dealt with fully under existing law. For that reason, I want to press new clause 1 to a vote.
	Under clause 1, prohibitions under a drink banning order
	"must include such prohibition as the court making it considers necessary, for that purpose, on the subject's entering premises in respect of which there is a premises licence authorising the use of the premises for the sale of alcohol by retail; and . . . club premises".
	My amendment No. 2 is a reasonable provision that seeks to insert into the clause the word "knowingly", because as we all know, some premises such as garages are licensed to sell alcohol, and it is entirely possible to enter a garage premises to get petrol unaware that it also holds a licence and sells wine and spirits.
	More importantly, amendment No. 3, on which I am considering asking you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, whether you would permit a separate vote, would simply insert into clause 1(3) the words,
	", and attempting to purchase alcohol in or consuming alcohol in,"
	That gets us round the problem, which we discussed ad nauseam in Committee, whereby supermarkets, under clause 1(3), would be covered by the ban. Let us remember that the court "must" include a prohibition, not "may". People would therefore be banned from going into supermarkets and corner shops. Would people living close to the only village shop or post office , which might sell alcohol, be banned from going into them? What about garages, sports clubs, hotels, restaurants and cinemas? We are talking about premises that by and large are not remotely connected with the fuelling of alcohol-related disorder, but that are licensed premises, and would therefore be caught under the provision prohibiting people who are subject to a drink banning order from entering them.
	During the second sitting of the Standing Committee, Conservative Members raised the issue of the premises that would be covered. We all know that the premises that cause the real problem in terms of alcohol-related disorder are pubs that behave irresponsibly. What about the premises that I listed earlier? Would a court ban people—as it appears it would have to—from entering all licensed premises?
	Having listened to the argument, the Minister said:
	"On 26 October I, the Home Secretary and Ministers from the Department of Culture, Media and Sport will meet the chief executives of the large supermarket chains, to talk about the issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised. I think that most people accept that they are a problem."
	I now ask the Minister to respond fully to my request, and to tell us exactly what happened at that meeting.
	The Minister went on to say—this is a critical point—
	"We are talking about the behaviour of the individual, and it will be for the courts to decide the appropriate prohibitions of an order. It may say"
	—I think that the Minister meant that the court might say—
	"that the individual can carry on using the corner shop if it is the only shop for 10 miles—although I doubt that—but he may be banned from buying alcohol there. He could still buy fish fingers, but not alcohol. If he bought alcohol from the garage rather than petrol, he would be in breach of the order and a sanction would follow—and properly so."—[Official Report, Standing Committee B,18 October 2005; c. 47–8.]
	Let us pause for a moment. Can the Minister tell us where the Bill says that the court has a power to act in any way that it thinks fit in relation to any particular licensed premises, by name or by description? I want her to be absolutely clear about that, and to answer my fundamental question: rather than including the rigmarole about premises with a licence, club premises and so forth, why does she not accept a straightforward amendment to the effect that a drink banning order may impose a prohibition on a person from entering licensed premises for the purpose of purchasing or consuming alcohol?
	In fewer words than those used by the Government, my amendment absolutely covers the position. No Member in his right mind wants to stop someone from entering a garage, supermarket or village shop. I can tell the Minister that plenty of people live in areas so rural that the only shop within miles where they can obtain their daily provisions is one with an alcohol licence. There are also plenty of people who rely entirely on their sport to keep them going. They will want to go on visiting sports clubs which have licences. Why not accept an amendment—amendment No. 4—which allows them to do that, but states that the order can prohibit them from buying or attempting to buy alcohol there, or from consuming it? I believe that those arguments are compelling.
	Amendment No. 13 brings us to the extraordinary word "disorderly". I want to insert a definition in clause 3. An earlier part of the Bill states that the court must be satisfied
	"that the individual has . . . engaged in criminal or disorderly conduct while under the influence of alcohol".
	The word "disorderly" utterly stumps me. It is not defined anywhere in the Bill, so I seek from the Minister some examples of what she means by "disorderly behaviour". Is it disorderly behaviour that is a crime or is it disorderly behaviour that falls short of a crime? I remember challenging a Government Member in Committee on precisely that issue. I asked whether she could provide some examples of disorderly behaviour that did not amount to a crime. In truth, she could not. If my memory serves me correctly, she first provided an example of someone who was plainly drunk and disorderly and subsequently examples of matters that were plainly a criminal offence.
	I have talked the issue through with legal colleagues who are utterly stumped by the Government's failure to define disorderly conduct. In an alcohol context, being drunk and disorderly is already a crime. My probing amendment No. 13 asks what is meant by "disorderly", and I would be most grateful for the Minister's clarification.
	The greatly respected organisation Justice takes a similar view. It believes that the threshold in clause 2(2) for the imposition of a drinking banning order is too broad. Drinking banning orders, it believes, should surely be aimed at those who
	"drunkenly commit acts of violence, criminal damage, threatening behaviour and similar crimes. It is, we believe, uncontroversial"—
	and I agree—
	"that mere high-spirited behaviour, (which most law-abiding people have indulged in at some time) should not result in a coercive order of this nature and severity."
	Where do high spirits come in relation to disorderly behaviour, what is the actual definition of disorderly and is it not already covered by existing criminal offences?
	On amendment No. 5, will the Minister define the difference between being under the influence of alcohol and drunk? The Bill purports to permit a drinking banning order to be made against someone who is
	"under the influence of alcohol",
	rather than drunk. I looked carefully at the legal precedents to see what definitions there were in existing legislation of being under the influence of alcohol compared with being drunk. We all know from our experience in the courts and, more commonly, as watchers rather than anything else, what a policeman would say about someone whom he or she deemed to be drunk. The policeman would say that the person's eyes were bloodshot, his speech slurred, he could not walk straight and so forth, so he was "drunk".
	What, then, of being under the influence of alcohol? The closest parallel that I can find is the drink-driving laws, where it is entirely possible to be
	"under the influence of alcohol",
	but not "drunk". Of course, drink-driving laws are administered through the use of a breathalyser at the roadside and thereafter a taximeter test at the police station. Someone whose breath intake of alcohol exceeds 35 mg or, in blood, 80 mg, is deemed to be under the influence of alcohol. That is the actual charge laid against someone driving a motor vehicle whilst under that influence, but it does not mean that they are drunk. According to the law, as determined by the breathalyser, they are under the influence of alcohol. Why, then, does clause 2(2) make it a condition for making the order that the individual has engaged in
	"disorderly conduct while under the influence of alcohol"?
	Does the Minister mean drunk and, if so, why does she not say so? If she means under the influence of alcohol, will she define exactly what that means?
	My amendment No. 6 relates to clause 5, which deals with the imposition of a drinking banning order. It seems sensible to me that the body responsible for imposing such an order should be the Crown who prosecutes the case, rather than the court. Courts often consider making such an order without reference to the Crown or without taking the Crown's views into account. It is more sensible to say that a drinking banning order should be made on an application by the Crown rather than of the court's own volition.
	My final amendment in this group, No. 14, tries to be helpful to the Government by inserting in the clause a definition of the word "disorderly". I simply ask the Minister to be kind enough—

Humfrey Malins: If a person in the street is drunk—I cannot make it much simpler than that—and is then disorderly, that is an offence of being drunk and disorderly. [Interruption.] The line lies where the police and the courts—thank God, we still have the courts—choose to draw it. Genuine high spirits, which does not amount to someone being drunk and disorderly, is not a criminal offence. I hope that the hon. Gentleman understands that.

Lynne Featherstone: I shall speak to amendments Nos. 28 and 30 and comment on other amendments in the group. With the permission of the House, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I shall probably put amendment No. 28 to a vote at the appropriate time.
	Amendment No. 28 is an attempt to ensure that a drinking banning order is not applied inappropriately—a point that, to some extent, we discussed in Committee. There are cases where an individual, through a number of conditions, is rendered incapable not just of complying with an order, but of understanding it. In such cases, a person may suffer from substance addiction, including alcohol dependency, or have a mental condition such as Asperger's syndrome or Tourette's syndrome.
	The amendment that we tabled in Committee stated that a court "must" have a report on each individual who appears before it. The Minister argued that the paperwork involved would create too heavy a bureaucracy and delays would occur. She said that drinking banning orders were meant to be a quick and effective punishment without being as cumbersome or severe as antisocial behaviour orders, which carry a much longer and more severe penalty.
	As suggested by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) in Committee, the amendment now says that courts "may" ask for a medical report so that they can be satisfied that the individual can understand and comply with a drinking banning order. I was persuaded by the Minister's argument about bureaucracy, and she offered to include in the guidance the need to consider asking for a medical report. On reflection, however, I decided that simply to place it in guidance is not enough of a safeguard for an individual who is thus incapacitated. I have modified the amendment to put the measure on the face of the Bill to ensure that all courts and advocates refer to it and recognise its relevance.
	Guidance for mental health problems is used to support antisocial behaviour order legislation, but it has not worked. One does not have to look far to find examples of ASBOs being served inappropriately. The British Institute for Brain Injured Children provided me with many examples, one of which in particular stuck in my mind. A 14-year-old boy was given an ASBO that included a curfew. He had to stick to it, but he had a mental age below that of a seven-year-old and could not tell the time. The boy and his family needed help to deal with their problems, and an ASBO was inappropriate in enabling them to receive guidance and support.
	With the amendment changed to "may" instead of "must"—I hope that the Minister is in a good mood—the judiciary would be able to avoid using a drinking banning order inappropriately while ensuring that the process was still quick. A doctor or GP should also be able to give their opinion to a court to speed that process further. If drinking banning orders are to work in the way envisaged by the Government, they should be swift procedures, more akin to parents grounding their naughty children. It should be a short punishment that is not meant to last a lifetime but to shock them into the error of their ways. We need to be sure that the vulnerable are adequately and properly protected.
	Amendment No. 30 returns to the issue of publicising individuals who are subject to a drinking banning order. The Government want to disapply the blanket ban on the publication of names and photographs of defendants under 18. We think that that contravenes the United Nations convention on the rights of the child. That is applied to the criminal law, and we are considering the civil law, but such publication would break with the spirit of the convention. We want to protect young people.
	I was surprised by the Minister's view in Committee that it was appropriate to put photos and names in the press. She argued that if I wanted the measure enforced, I should be happy with that, because the more publicity that names and faces received, the more likely it would be that the individual would be recognised going into an area where he should not be. However, it would be far more appropriate to give that information to interested parties, such as licensees, local authorities and police, rather than pillorying those people in the press.

Jeremy Wright: The Minister advanced the same argument in Committee. She might remember that I asked her a question about the matter. Does she accept that it would be perfectly feasible for people to breach the community penalty that they received for breaching a drinking banning order, yet to be able to continue with the drinking banning order? In other words, they could decide not to drink, even though they would have breached their community penalty. If people can do that, does it not undermine the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) that the response to the breach of a drinking banning order should directly be a custodial penalty? Such an option would remain available, would it not?

Hazel Blears: If the hon. Gentleman looks at the Bill, he will see that clause 1(2) states:
	"Such an order may impose any prohibition on the subject which is necessary for the purpose of protecting other persons from criminal or disorderly conduct by the subject while he is under the influence of alcohol."
	"Any prohibition" may therefore be imposed by the court. Clause 1(3) lists the mandatory requirements of such a prohibition. A supermarket prohibition could therefore be made under clause 1(2), but not under clause 1(3)(a) or (b).
	Under amendment No. 28 the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green seeks to reintroduce an earlier amendment that required the court to receive a report on the subject's mental and physical health and substance addictions. We had a long discussion about that Committee, and I accept that the hon. Lady has changed "must" in her earlier amendment to "may". However, local authorities already have a duty under the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 to assess anyone who may be in need of community care services. If there is any evidence to suggest that someone is suffering from a syndrome or problem that prevents them from understanding the order social services authorities must make sure that they are subject to an assessment, which should run alongside the collection of evidence and an application for an order. I do not want inordinate delay and a bureaucratic system. Drinking banning orders, as we have discussed, are meant to be a short, sharp shock. They enable the court to deal proactively with someone accused of committing an offence under the influence of alcohol. If we include a panoply of provisions to cover the handful of such cases the courts will be inhibited from using the power to protect the decent, law-abiding majority. We must be aware of vulnerable individuals, but we must not predicate all our legislation on one or two specific cases; otherwise we will undermine its very purpose.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Lady knows that the courts have discretion when looking at the cases that are brought before them. They must be satisfied that two requirements are met: first, someone must be guilty of offending behaviour; and, secondly, it must be necessary to make the order. The court will consider a range of factors when deciding whether the second requirement has been met. May I advise the hon. Lady that my comments are meant kindly? She has talked a great deal about human rights, which are important. However, we have to achieve a balance of human rights, and respect the human rights of the decent, law-abiding majority whose peaceful existence is threatened when people drink far too much and get out of control, causing the nuisance that happens far too often. Getting that balance right is important, but in this instance she is wrongly seeking to put the rights of the perpetrator above those of decent members of the community.
	Amendments Nos. 13 and 14, which were tabled by the Opposition, seek to include a definition of "disorderly" to cover
	"conduct which would offend an ordinary person but which falls short of a criminal act."
	We had a long discussion about that in Committee. There is no need to define the word "disorderly" in the Bill. It is not defined in relation to the offence of being drunk and disorderly in section 91 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The Select Committee on Home Affairs concluded that it would be a mistake to try to define more closely the current definition of antisocial behaviour. The courts are perfectly aware of behaviour that is disorderly, and of behaviour that results in a criminal act. In Committee, I gave the hon. Member for Woking an example of disorderly behaviour. If a large group of people are marauding through an area, kicking over bins and causing excessive noise, they may not necessarily commit a public order offence, but they are certainly guilty of disorderly behaviour.
	The hon. Gentleman talked about high spirits, but in Committee some telling examples were given, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Brent, South (Ms Butler), who said that "high spirits" was not an accurate description of the problems in her community.
	Amendment No. 5 would require that for orders on conviction the court must be satisfied that the individual was drunk, rather than under the influence of alcohol. That would raise the threshold at which a drinking banning order could be obtained and could lead to a wide range of offenders who were under the influence of alcohol escaping the prohibitions imposed by a DBO. I think that it is for the courts to come to a view based on the evidence before them on whether an offender was under the influence of alcohol when they committed an offence. I ask hon. Members to think about the sort of problem that we are trying to tackle. The courts are well placed to determine whether someone was under the influence of alcohol. I direct the House's attention to the second limb of the offence, which is that for an order to be made, it must be necessary to protect the rest of the community. The courts will examine that closely before making an order.
	Amendment No. 6 would ensure that a court must consider only applications by the Crown. That would defeat part of our purpose, which is to encourage the proactive use of DBOs. The court would have to wait for the Crown to make an application; it would not be able to consider the matter of its own volition. That would weaken our proposals.
	Liberal Democrat amendment No. 30 would reimpose automatic reporting restrictions in proceedings for an order on conviction involving young people. Several hon. Members have said that they consider it useful not to bind the court to automatic reporting restrictions. That does not mean that restrictions cannot apply in specific, narrow cases if they are necessary for the protection of the individual. I happen to believe that if people have gone out, deliberately got drunk, got involved in violent behaviour under the influence of alcohol, and acted in a such a way that the court finds it necessary to make an order to protect the rest of the public, it is extremely hard to make a case for their name and details being kept a secret from the rest of the community, who have been the victims of that behaviour. Far from being a badge of honour, being banned from one's favourite pubs and clubs is likely to be a good incentive to change one's behaviour. In addition, it is important that local people are able to report it to the police if they see the individuals in question in pubs and clubs from which they are banned, so that action can be taken in relation to the breach.
	Government amendment No. 43 gives district councils the same right as county councils to make applications for DBOs, which is entirely right and proper. Government amendment No. 42 is merely a small consequential amendment. The other Government amendments are welcome tidying measures. Clause 23 is to be removed because, on reflection, we realised that the DBO provisions make the Licensed Premises (Exclusion of Certain Persons) Act 1980 superfluous. We can achieve everything that we want to achieve through the DBO route, which is a much better provision. The 1980 legislation is extremely narrow—it depends on a conviction on the licensed premises themselves.
	The DBO is—dare I say to the hon. Member for Woking?—a more modern and appropriate way in which to deal with the mischief we encounter in our communities these days. I ask him and his hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), who has taken a very legalistic approach to various pieces of our legislation, to think carefully about making sure that legislation is modern, flexible, about changing behaviour and able to cope with the new challenges that we face, rather than cleaving to the traditional interpretation of the law and focusing simply on prosecution. Making available ASBOs and DBOs is about making sure that our criminal justice system is modern, flexible and able to meet the challenges of this day and age.

Humfrey Malins: Over the years, I have become increasingly used to people walking out, rather that in, when I begin to speak. Today is no exception.
	Conservative Members feel strongly about new clause 2 and I hope to test the opinion of the House on it. New clause 7, which the Liberal Democrats tabled, is roughly along the same lines. I hope also to speak briefly about amendments Nos. 20 and 21.
	As was said in an earlier debate, knife crime has rocketed in the past eight years. Recent reports show that knife crime in England and Wales has leaped by as much as 90 per cent. in two years in some areas. Figures that were released not long ago under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 show a total of nearly 25,000 knife crimes last year logged by the 30 police forces that supplied figures. The highest rise in knife crime was recorded by Nottinghamshire police. In Nottinghamshire, offences involving blades increased from 338 in 2002 to 650 last year—a rise of 92 per cent. The number of muggings that involve knives has shot up. That worries us all, including the police. The assistant chief constable of Devon and Cornwall, Tony Melville, who is the Association of Chief Police Officers' spokesman on knife crime, stated:
	"Lots and lots of people are carrying knives in public places—in many parts of society it now seems to be a credible and normal thing to carry a knife."
	I have some experience of our courts sitting judicially. The offence of carrying a bladed article, which is contrary to section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, is not only prevalent but increasing. It is a terrifying experience for a complainant or victim to witness somebody in the street taking out a knife. Far too many people carry knives for offensive purposes. Doctors report a marked increase in the number of patients who arrive at accident and emergency with stab wounds. Such crime is not only on the increase but deadly serious and must be stamped out.
	I have listened to witnesses who gave evidence in criminal trials and recounted with terror how they felt when someone in the street drew a knife. They suffered nightmares for months afterwards. The amount of knife crime has undoubtedly increased—there is a culture of the blade. Many young people believe it to be brave to carry a knife. In truth, it is cowardly. However, the number of prosecutions against people for carrying knives and the level of detection remain abysmally low. The courts do not pass sufficiently stiff sentences. They seem sometimes to have forgotten the importance of deterrence.
	I strongly commend new clause 2 to the House because it would send a signal to the knife-carrying fraternity that we want to see them severely punished. Under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, it is an offence to carry a bladed article in a public place. There are certain defences, including having a reasonable excuse or lawful authority, but that is the basic offence. It applies to knives with a blade of 3 in or longer. Earlier today, the prevalence of knife-carrying in schools was mentioned, but it is happening not only in schools but out on the streets. I suggest that the police, if asked their opinion, would say that knife-carrying is one of the fastest-growing offences at the moment. It is therefore essential to give the courts the facility to sentence people on indictment to more than two years in prison for this quite dreadful offence.
	Some statistics might be of interest to the House. Charges relating to bladed articles have run at between roughly 4,500 and 6,500 a year over the past five years. In 1999, about 4,500 people were proceeded against for carrying a bladed article, of whom about 3,500 were found guilty. In 2003, about 6,800 were proceeded against, of whom 5,311 were found guilty. One might have thought that more people would go to prison for such a serious offence. Being confronted at any time, but particularly at night, by someone carrying a blade in the street is the most terrifying experience.

Humfrey Malins: My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. The new clause would simply give a different maximum sentence, not a different minimum. By giving the courts that power, the Minister would permit them to retain the flexibility that they sometimes need. It would not at any stage prevent a court from imposing the sentence that it thought fit, be it considerably less than five years or even less than the current maximum of two years. As my right hon. Friend says, however, it would permit the heavier sentence of five years to be passed in the worst cases. Critically, it would also send a signal to the knife-carrying fraternity that we will not put up with them and that Parliament is beginning to take notice of this increase in crime.
	As I said, 5,311 persons were found guilty of the offence of carrying a knife in a public place in 2003. How many of them were actually placed in custody? We might think that 50, 60 or 70 per cent. ought to have been placed in custody—these figures include repeat offenders—but the truth is that only 755, out of well over 5,000, faced a custodial sentence. That means that the people who carry knives on our streets understand that their chances of being caught are very slim, that detection rates are dropping, that they are unlikely to be prosecuted and that their chances of receiving a custodial sentence on conviction are only about one in seven. Times have never been better for the knife carrier, and it is high time that Parliament sent a message to the knife carrier that times are going to get worse.
	It is clear that knife crime has increased dramatically in the past few years, but I shall not go further into the figures. I shall simply repeat the fact that it is a terrifying crime. I cannot see any reason for the Government to object to new clause 2, which simply says that the maximum penalty for carrying a bladed article should be increased from two to five years. Such a sentence would not have to be imposed in every case. The advantage of such a measure is that it would send a signal to the courts that Parliament takes knife-carrying very seriously. It would send a signal to the people who carry knives that the maximum sentence that they could face had been increased from two years to five. It would also send a signal to the victims of knife crime that we take their side and want the courts to be much more robust in dealing with those who carry knives.
	Amendments Nos. 20 and 21 also stand in my name in this group. The Bill creates an offence of
	"using someone to mind a weapon".
	I have no criticism of the Government for introducing this measure; indeed, I would go further and say that it is much to be valued as a tool in our armoury against people who are part of the knife culture. The amendments are designed to tease out from the Minister whether bladed articles are included in the description "dangerous weapon" in clause 24.
	Let me set the scene. Under clause 24, a person is guilty of an offence if
	"he uses another to look after, hide or transport a dangerous weapon for him".
	The clause goes on to state that "dangerous weapon" means
	"a weapon to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (c. 33) applies (knives and bladed weapons)".
	It is not entirely clear to me that section 141A actually applies to a bladed article, although such an offence is covered in section 139 of the Act. Will the Minister explain whether minding a weapon—which, under clause 25 of the Bill, carries a sentence of up to four years—includes minding a bladed article? For example, if it is an offence to mind or look after a knuckle-duster, a sword or some other weapon that is undoubtedly an offensive weapon per se, and the offender is liable to up to four years in prison, I can understand and readily accept that. However, the purpose of my two probing amendments is to determine whether a bladed article is covered by the description "dangerous weapon". If it is, we shall find ourselves in a slightly odd situation.
	The maximum penalty for carrying a bladed article in public is at present two years in prison, but if I were to ask someone to look after that bladed article off the street, it would be an even more serious offence, carrying a four-year prison sentence. That would be slightly odd. Frankly, it is more serious for me to carry a bladed article in the street than to ask a friend to look after it in case I wanted to carry it in the street next week. The friend would thereby keep it off the street. It is strange, if I am right, that I am liable to four years for the second of those activities—asking my friend to look after it—but liable to only two years if, in effect, I am carrying it on the street.
	If bladed articles are included, can the Minister cover what appears to be an odd situation in terms of sentencing powers? If they are not included among dangerous weapons, can she tell us whether it is an offence if I ask somebody to look after a bladed instrument on the basis that I might shortly need to take it out on the street for offensive purposes? If that is not an offence, why not? The culture of the knife is on the up and it is vital that Parliament recognises that and sends a signal to the criminal fraternity, the world at large, the judiciary and victims of knife crime that we recognise how terrible it is and propose to give the courts a higher sentencing option in relation to the dreadful offence of carrying a bladed article in a public place. I can see no arguments from the Minister that can possibly resist my proposition in the new clause.

Lynne Featherstone: I want to speak to new clause 7, which is not totally dissimilar to new clause 2, except that our provision exceeds that of the Conservatives by two years. I agree with everything that the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) said, because having a bladed article in a public place is punished with two years' imprisonment whereas carrying a firearm is an offence punishable by up to seven years' imprisonment.
	Whether one is murdered by a knife or gun, the result is precisely the same—one is dead. That exactitude of outcome needs to be reflected by an exactitude of punishment, and perhaps more so in the case of knives as the incidence of knife purchase, carrying and use has soared in recent years, as has been said. That needs to be tackled. In response to an oral question from my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten), the Home Secretary said that he would examine bringing gun and knife crimes more into line. The Bill provides the ideal opportunity for the Government to address that differential.
	I acknowledge that this part of the Bill presents a difficulty, and I appreciate what the Government are trying to achieve in relation to the reduction of knife crime. I fear, however, that one of their measures—raising the age at which one can purchase a knife to 18—might bring the law into disrepute, as it is difficult to imagine how it could be prosecuted. Under the Bill, all knives, however commonly available, would be subject to the offence if purchased under-age. The enforceability and effectiveness of the provision must therefore be questioned. It is ridiculous that people can get married and have children at 16 but not buy their cutlery. Someone under 18 might also legitimately ask a third party to purchase a knife for them, and no satisfactory answer has been given as to the culpability of the third party if a knife so circuitously purchased were used to kill.
	A gun has limited use, but knives do not, so we believe that it would be better to strengthen the law in other areas and to propose restrictions on carrying in a public place and restrictions on what type of knife might fall under the provision. In relation to increasing the sentence for carrying knives in a public place to parity with that for guns, we believe that we are better able to tackle irresponsible and criminal use of knives and the mischief that the Government seek to address if we still allow the purchase of knives where that is done responsibly and for a harmless purpose.

John Redwood: I strongly support my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) in raising this important point. Many of us have seen a growing incidence of knife-based crime in our communities, which is alarming. I am pleased that he is campaigning on the issue and is trying to get the Government to take suitable action to deal with it. I am also pleased that the Government are legislating and I hope that the Minister will explain, if she does not welcome my hon. Friend's initiative, what else could be done to reassure people that knife crime can be brought under control.
	I also hope that the Minister and the Government can reassure us that there is no intention to obstruct the defence to alleged crimes of carrying a knife in a public place that someone has just been to the shop to buy new kitchen knives and is transporting them home, has taken a broken or damaged knife to a repair shop and is taking it home, or is getting a knife sharpened. Of course, it must be a legitimate defence that someone is carrying a dangerous-looking knife in the cause of their trade—when people come to fit carpets or other floor coverings they often carry really frightening-looking knives, but they seem effective at doing their job, and such people would not be using them for criminal purposes. Although there is nothing about that in the Bill or in my hon. Friend's new clause, I hope that the Minister will reassure us that that is implied and will carry forward from previous legislation. Some mistaken comments have been made, which are unfortunate. We want a world in which law-abiding citizens, if they need a knife for the purpose of their trade or wish to take new knives back to their home, should be free to do so.
	A stronger signal should be sent out, however, that the rising tide of knife crime is unacceptable and that if people are caught in public places with knives around their person for no good reason, very strong action will be taken. Although a person carrying a knife might not go out with a criminal intent, if they get involved in an argument or come under the influence of drink all sorts of dreadful things might happen that could not happen if that person has been persuaded not to carry the knife in the first place.

Hazel Blears: I want to thank Members for welcoming the Government's legislation on these issues. We are all concerned about the rise in people carrying knives and, in some cases, being prepared to use them. We therefore need strong legislation.
	I am afraid that I cannot agree, however, that the maximum penalty for the offence of possession—two years—is inadequate. To set that in context, there is a different though related offence—possession of an offensive weapon, under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953—which has a maximum penalty of four years. Which offence people will be charged with, and which offence is fulfilled, is a matter of circumstances. It is sometimes said that the second offence of possession of an offensive weapon is hardly ever prosecuted. I am happy to reassure Members that figures for 2004 showed that around 5,800 people were convicted of the more serious offence, which has a maximum penalty of four years, which is broadly the same number as were charged with the lesser offence of possession of a knife or bladed weapon. It is not a little-used offence, which is why the prosecuting authorities and police consider carefully which category defendants ought to fall into.
	An "offensive weapon" means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or some other person. Clearly, therefore, the nature of the weapon, and the intention of the person carrying it, are an issue. There are certain key factors that put the offender into one category rather than the other. The first is the weapon itself—there is a whole schedule of different weapons that cannot be perceived as having any innocent use, such as butterfly knives, disguised knives and sword sticks, which are offensive weapons per se. If one is caught with those, one is automatically subject to the offence that carries the higher maximum penalty of four years. An offender can be charged with that more serious offence if he is in possession of, say, a kitchen knife, but threatens others with it—as was mentioned, if he draws it in the night, frightens people with it, or it is shown that he planned to use it. Someone who draws what would otherwise be an innocuous item in a threatening way, with intention to use it, may be judged to have committed the more serious offence, which carries a maximum of four years' imprisonment. The two-year maximum relates to the simple act of being in possession of a knife that is capable of being used non-violently in a public place. As the hon. Member for Woking says, we want to ensure that decent law-abiding citizens can still buy knives that could be used entirely legitimately without falling foul of the law. There is already a defence of having a knife with good reason or lawful authority.
	I think we agree that maximum penalties should generally be proportionate, the aim being to indicate the relative seriousness of the crime. New clause 2 would raise the maximum sentence to five years, while the Liberal Democrats' new clause 7 would raise it to seven. I do not think that we are in the business of having a Dutch auction, but a comparator might be the offence of causing actual bodily harm, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Injury caused by that offence can be minor, but it is nevertheless real injury. Someone who simply possesses a knife without any intention of using it or threatening anyone with it could be subject to a higher maximum prison sentence than someone who had actually caused physical injury. That is why we believe that a two-year sentence is adequate for the former offence. Of course those who use knives are subject to penalties for offences ranging from actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and wounding with intent to much more serious offences, such as murder. Obviously severe penalties are available for those who use their knives.
	The Sentencing Guidelines Council and the sentencing advisory panel are consulting on the "seriousness" test, in the context of a weapon's use as an aggravating factor. We entirely agree that higher sentences should be imposed on those who use knives in violent crime, but we think that that should be done through the Sentencing Guidelines Council. I hope that neither the hon. Member for Woking nor the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) will press their new clauses.
	Government amendment No. 45 merely corrects an error in the drafting of clause 24. We want to make it clear that the definition of "dangerous weapon" does not include air weapons or components thereof.
	Amendments Nos. 20 and 21 are a little more complex. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Woking for welcoming some of our proposals, and I hope that I can now be equally generous to him. The amendments concern the definition of "dangerous weapon" in clause 24. In its present form, the clause applies to
	"a firearm other than an air weapon or . . . a weapon to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 . . . applies (knives and bladed weapons)."
	Amendment No. 20 would alter the second part of the definition to include section 139 of the 1988 Act, which contains a wider definition than the one in section 141A. It includes articles with a blade or point per se—not necessarily a knife or a bladed weapon. Compasses have been used as an example in the past. Section 141A includes such articles only if they were made or adapted to cause injury to a person.
	A screwdriver, for instance, might have been specially sharpened for use as a weapon. It would fall within the section 141A definition of a knife or bladed weapon, because it would have been turned into a weapon. It would not, however, be covered by the wider definition sought by the hon. Gentleman, which would include objects that had not been made or adapted to cause injury.

Humfrey Malins: I warmly thank the Minister for her constructive approach to my amendments. I think that we all want to ensure that someone who said, "Please transport my bladed article across the city and give it to me at the other side, because I intend to do something with it tonight which I do not want to tell you about because it is not very kind" would be guilty of an offence. It was very thoughtful of the Minister to say that she would consider the matter.
	This is a rare situation. The Minister has been kind enough to express sympathy with two of my amendments, and she is thinking of acting on them. I may achieve a first before long and have an amendment accepted by the Government, even if my drafting is not quite up to it.
	Let me return to the important principle of a maximum sentence. I repeat that it is a maximum, not a minimum. Conservative Members believe that a maximum sentence of two years for carrying a bladed article is too low, in view of the enormous increase in such offences. The Minister said that the maximum sentence for carrying an offensive weapon was four years. We do not need to discuss what constitutes an offensive weapon; we know that a knuckleduster, for instance, is an offensive weapon per se. On the other hand, items made or adapted for offensive purposes can also come under the definition of offensive weapons. A perfectly innocent item such as a baseball bat, or a cricket bat—I apologise to the cricketers among us, if there are any—[Interruption.] I understand that there are distinguished cricketers on the Conservative Benches; and I forgot to mention your vital role, Mr. Deputy Speaker, in relation to parliamentary cricket, which is on our minds all the time and is much appreciated. Anyway, carrying a cricket bat in public with unlawful intent would put someone in the frame for carrying an offensive weapon. Actually, I would rather come across someone carrying a cricket bat in public than a bladed article. On that note, I believe that it is important to test the House's opinion on whether the maximum sentence for a vicious, nasty offence of carrying a bladed article in public should, in these difficult times, be lifted to five years maximum. I believe that it should and I hope that the House does, too.

Humfrey Malins: It may indeed be a difficult offence to investigate and bring charges, which is clearly why the Government have made it so much easier by giving us the new offence of doing it three times. Of course, that will ease the position, and the hon. Lady's undoubtedly sincere doubts about the ability to enforce the law will be eased by the fact that, now that it is an offence to do it three times, it will be a matter of great simplicity for the police force.
	I merely wonder in amendment No. 12 whether a custodial sentence for that very serious offence should be inserted in the Bill. I shall bring my remarks to a close by saying that those who are engaged in the wine, spirit and pub world are universally concerned and worried—very properly so—about the whole concept of alcohol disorder zones and would undoubtedly support my proposition that the charges should be imposed only where there is an element of guilt.
	The Campaign for Real Ale was one of the first to write to me saying that the zones might
	"inhibit moves towards a more responsible drinking environment by treating",
	as the Bill does,
	"all licensees the same regardless of steps taken to encourage responsible drinking."
	CAMRA, like many others, believes that there should be discounts for well-run community public houses.
	Justice, which is a very respected organisation, is again
	"concerned that these zones discriminate insufficiently between premises that are a cause of alcohol-fuelled crime and disorder and other premises that merely happen to be in the same locality."
	It is concerned about clause 12(7)(b), which provides that
	"premises whose main purpose is the sale of alcohol may not be exempted from charges."
	It believes that
	"those premises that are not contributing to offending behaviour should be exempt from charges.
	It is also right in saying that
	"premises for which exemptions are allowed by clause 12(7) may include those that are contributing substantially to disorder—there may even be legal argument as to whether nightclubs are included."
	I hope that the Minister will comment on that.
	I had a long meeting with Tesco, which represents several people interested in the supermarket trade. It, like many others, is extremely responsible in its approach to the sale of alcohol. There is a strong argument that such supermarkets should be excluded from the provisions altogether, because the main purpose of entering them is not to buy alcohol. The Government's assertion that off-licence shops and supermarkets are a significant cause of alcohol-fuelled disorder is not good because their consultation in January conceded that any causal link between the behaviour of an individual and off-sales of alcohol was "tenuous".
	The British Retail Consortium is among other bodies that have added their objections to the concept. It talks about its attitude towards responsible retailing and expresses concern about the absence of an appeal. Interestingly, it points out that
	"this legislation applies to all retailers who hold a licence to sell alcohol. This would include shops such as John Lewis, Boots and Next who sell alcohol at promotional times of the year but are in no way connected with the problem of alcohol fuelled violence."
	Will the Minister confirm whether such premises would be exempt?
	The Wine and Spirit Trade Association, which is a responsible body, says:
	"We are concerned that the introduction of alcohol disorder zones . . . will have unintended consequences."
	It says that the zones will
	"penalise small businesses on the basis of their location and will levy charges on responsible business to pay for less-conscientious retailers."
	It feels strongly about the matter. Apparently, Home Office officials have made it absolutely clear that
	"all restaurants and hotel bars will be exempt from charges".
	Will the Minister confirm whether the Home Office has said that? If so, is it wise?
	A principal objection is the catch-all and unjust nature of alcohol disorder zone provisions. I repeat again that the Association of Chief Police Officers opposes the concept. The British Hospitality Association is worried on behalf of restaurants, cinemas and gyms. It is concerned about the unfairness of many of the provisions that face it.
	Amendment No. 18, which addresses charges in alcohol disorder zones, would ensure that we include in the Bill at least a reference to the fact that payment should be made by those who are culpable, rather than those who are not. The rest of my amendments draw the House's attention to the fact, which must by now be absolutely plain, that clauses 12 and 13 are riddled with uncertainty and vagueness. The Minister has a duty to the House to put us straight on exactly what she means.

John Redwood: I share the passion of the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) to see something done about drunken and disorderly conduct in town centres. The issue before the House is not whether we wish to tackle such gross abuse of our town centres at night—everyone in the House wishes to do so—but how we can do that most effectively and justly.
	I support the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins), especially amendments Nos. 18 and 16, which go to the heart of the issue. It would be not merely unjust to impose a tax or levy on licensed premises or restaurants with licences that are perfectly well run, but totally ineffective. Just as the hon. Member for Stockport is passionate about wishing to control disorder in Stockport, I am passionate about wishing to control disorder anywhere in our country, especially places near my constituency. However, I do not for one moment believe that if we impose an extra tax or levy on those who run orderly premises in our society, it will have any impact on disorder. We need to get to the cause of the disorder.
	Licensed premises in some towns and other centres might be breaking the rules of their licence, or breaking the law. If they are knowingly selling alcohol to minors, they should be prosecuted. If they are knowingly selling alcohol to people who have already had too much—and visibly so—we are all in favour of action being taken. However, Conservative Members are worried about an ineffective and unjust proposal that will allow any premises with a licence to be clobbered because people misbehave, although many such premises will have had nothing whatsoever to do with the offence and the misbehaviour.
	It is likely that in many cases a locality will mean a complete town centre. In a town such as Reading, which I know well because it just over the border from my constituency, or even a small and relatively well-ordered town such as Wokingham, it will be difficult to draw a line between different streets. Drunkenness spills out across the town centre, and councillors are likely to want to make the whole area into a zone. It is therefore vital that the Minister tells us in general what exemptions would be permitted inside such a large area, which will include many licenses premises that have nothing to do with the trouble.
	The Government argue that the people who cause the problems ought to be made to pay. However, those problems are caused primarily not by individuals running licensed premises and businesses but by the drunks themselves. How do the Government propose to make sure that they pay their fair share towards cleaning up the mess and dealing with the damage, and towards the cost of the extra health and policing services that are needed?
	Why do the Government think that it makes good or effective law to charge innocent people who are trying to run decent businesses in a town centre and who may offer a countervailing pressure to the unruly behaviour of a minority in a limited number of premises? That would not improve the situation, and would clearly make it worse. The only thing that it is likely to do is drive more of the decent businesses out of town centres to areas where they will not become part of a zone, thus compounding the problem in the town centre, where the wrong kind of businesses will remain. I hope that the Government take seriously the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking, and introduce a provision along those lines.

Sammy Wilson: It is a difficult question. We have to define the zone fairly well, but just because there are difficulties we cannot take the view that we should not try to recoup some of the costs associated with alcohol-related disorder.
	I accept that some sellers of alcohol are more irresponsible than others. I therefore ask the Minister for some reassurance regarding the practical implications of the measure. The Bill provides that for the fixing of
	"different rates for . . . different descriptions of premises"
	and different rates of discount. Will the Minister give examples? Will such conditions and provisions ensure that differentiation of premises is possible? I do not accept that we can take a black-and-white view in which some are wholly guiltless and make no contribution to the problems. We would run into great difficulties if we tried to do so. No landlord will say, "I am a bad landlord." All will say that they are good landlords, but we know that some try to get as much money as they can from youngsters in as short a time as possible. Those people will be penalised more than those who attempt to reduce the effects of the sale of alcohol.

Hazel Blears: We will introduce regulations, which will be subject to debate, but today we should debate the principle of alcohol disorder zones.
	I am happy to confirm to the hon. Member for East Antrim that different charges will be based on a risk assessment of extra enforcement activity in relation to individual premises, and the risk assessment for a 1,000 capacity nightclub may be very different from that for a small local pub. We will also examine discounts, which cannot be introduced until we have introduced the principles and standards code of practice to which the industry will sign up. Once that agreement is in place, people who abide by the provisions in the code of practice will be eligible for discounts, which, at least partially, addresses the point raised by the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green that people who comply with the action plan should be subject to a lower charge. When bar and pub owners do their best to be responsible, it should be acknowledged.
	I want to discuss the individual amendments, because we need a little time to discuss some of the other provisions in the Bill. I reject the amendments that seek to establish an audit trail and culpability, which is not the idea behind alcohol disorder zones. I reject the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Woking on decisions being made in Whitehall, which would be extremely bureaucratic. This is a local power and it should be used locally. When an area is defined, tension may arise, which is why I said in Committee that the police and the local authority must be careful when they draw the boundary and make sure that it is not either too wide or too narrow to catch the mischief that they are seeking to address.
	Opposition amendments Nos. 15 and 16 would prescribe the purposes to which funding may be put, but we do not need to include such a provision in the Bill. I made it clear in Committee that the range of additional interventions will be set out in regulations and guidance and I discussed police enforcement and trading standards test purchasing. For example, environmental health officers can deal with excessive noise, which causes a significant problem for many of our constituents, and areas such as street cleaning are important, too.
	Liberal Democrat amendments Nos. 33, 40 and 41 seek to widen the exemption. At the moment, the exemption has two limbs—whether the principal use of the premises is the sale and supply of alcohol and whether the principal reason why people visit a premises is to obtain alcohol. In order to obtain an exemption, people must meet both limbs of that test, and as I said in Committee, hotels and restaurants—I also mentioned gyms and theatres in my letter—would meet that exemption test.
	The Liberal Democrat amendments seek to narrow the exemption test in one way and to widen it in another. Under those amendments, an irresponsible hotel or restaurant would be responsible for the charges, despite having met the test. However, that returns us to the first issue, which is that one would have to be able to see that that individual premise was causing the problem. If an individual premise causes a problem, consideration should be given to using the powers in the Licensing Act 2003 to address that narrow point.
	Amendment No. 41 seeks to widen the limb, but it is not appropriate. It would allow people who comply with the action plan not to contribute to costs, but that might be difficult. If the action plan included making a financial contribution in order to facilitate the introduction of proper street-cleaning services, the viability of the alcohol disorder zone might be at risk if several premises did not have to contribute.

David Lepper: On alcohol disorder zones being a last resort, does the Minister agree that in an area in which a problem clearly exists, local businesses should consider the power in the Local Government Act 2003 to introduce, with the consent of local businesses, business improvement districts, which would deal with many such problems at a much earlier stage?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
	Amendment No. 109, in page 29, line 40 [Clause 28], after 'weapon', insert
	'with a muzzle energy in excess of 1 joule'.
	Amendment No. 110, in page 30, line 24, leave out Clause 29.
	Government amendment Nos. 46, 47 and 48.

Jonathan Djanogly: With little time on the clock, I declare my interest as the holder of a shot gun licence, the owner of an air rifle and a member of the British Association for Shooting and Conservation.
	I am belatedly pleased that the Government have tabled amendments to deal with some matters that we raised in Committee. However, many thousands of people continue to be worried by the uncertainty that has been caused by the manner in which the Bill has progressed. We wholeheartedly support measures that will have a genuine, practical effect on reducing gun crime in the UK and making our systems safer. However, we do not support clauses that create laws for the sake of being seen to be tough on gun crime, but whose effect will be felt almost exclusively by legitimate users of weapons, not the criminals on whom we intend to crack down.
	The root of the remaining problems with part 2 is that we do not believe that sufficient consultation has been held with affected as well as expert bodies. Where is the firearms advisory committee, which should have been the proper body to consult about the Bill? The Government said that they would form that committee before abolishing their previous consulting committee, but they failed to do that.
	The Government have yet to publish anything that relates to the 4,000-odd responses to the May 2004 consultation paper on controls on firearms. I submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, but it elicited the entirely unsatisfactory response that the information would still not be released. This adds further weight to our grave concerns about the fundamental basis of this part of the Bill.
	On amendment No. 108, our position remains that the impact of the changes to the law two years ago should be assessed fully before yet further laws penalising legitimate users of air weapons are introduced. Clause 27 requires anyone who sells air weapons by way of trade or business to register with the police as a firearms dealer. The Minister said in Committee that the registration fee was likely to be £150 per establishment. Will she please confirm that that is the case?
	In Committee, the Minister undertook to provide information on how the licensing regime was to work. On Thursday night last week, we received a letter which hardly explained the situation. Perhaps she could now explain, for example, what a fishing store would have to do in order to continue to be able to sell air weapons, and how long it would take to do it. Clause 27 would prohibit any person other than a registered dealer from selling or transferring air weapons. Where is the evidence that airguns are misused through being obtained through trade sources rather than private sales? It is hard enough to accept these changes to the Bill so late in the day, but to do so without being given anything to support, explain or justify the clauses relating to air weapons is quite another matter. As I said in Committee, clauses 27 and 28, when taken together with clause 29, will have a serious and unjustifiably adverse effect on legitimate users of airguns and on persons carrying on the business of selling them.
	Amendment No. 108 seeks to remove the burdensome, impractical and pointless requirement to keep a register of air weapons. I want to address the amendment in the context of clause 27 as a whole, because they are inextricably linked. I raised this issue in Committee, but the Minister did not address it at the time. There are an estimated 7 million air weapons in circulation in this country. I do not think that the Government are proposing that those 7 million weapons should be registered; I believe that only future sales will be affected. Perhaps the Minister will confirm that. If that is the case, how would the measure work in practice? If clause 27 does not propose to register the existing 7 million air weapons, will not subsection (2)—which would require a register of transactions—be futile? There will be 7 million unregistered air weapons in circulation, and this proposal would merely impose a disproportionate administrative burden on registered firearms dealers. The requirement to maintain full records of air weapons sales in a firearms register would simply be unnecessary red tape.
	Fewer than 50 per cent. of airguns are sold by registered firearms dealers. The majority are sold by sports shops, fishing shops and similar outlets. No evidence has been produced to show that airguns sold through registered firearms dealers are more or less likely to be misused than those sold through other retail outlets. There is no evidence that retailers who are not registered firearms dealers are irresponsible in selling airguns to the public. Nor is there evidence to suggest that the proposed restrictions will improve public safety.
	A simpler system would involve creating a lawful check on the sale of firearms, but without the need for registration. One such system could involve ensuring that any person who wished to sell air weapons should apply in writing to the police for written authority to do so. This would essentially be a much simpler system of licensing. If the police believed that the applicant was not a fit person to sell airguns, they could refuse to give their authority. The applicant could then be given the right of appeal. As we said in Committee, a modified form of licensing would be more acceptable, but no changes have been forthcoming from the Government since then. Rather than requiring full registration, regulation could be achieved by using simpler, less restrictive regimes. What I continue to find most bizarre is that the Home Office consultation paper of May 2004 stated that
	"we do not therefore believe that there should be a system of licensing or further restrictions on the sale of air guns".
	I must ask the Minister why the Government are ignoring their own advice.
	Banning the sale of air weapons except through registered firearms dealers approved by the police is an impractical, draconian, burdensome and disproportionate measure, and the Government have failed to provide any evidence that it will have any effect on violent crime. It will serve only to penalise business people and sports persons involved in shooting.
	In the Home Office regulatory impact assessment, the Home Office recognises that licensing all air weapons would result in a significant decrease in sales of air weapons and a significant impact on business. The assessment stated:
	"We understand that the majority of air weapons are sold through small dealers and tackle shops, so small firms would be affected disproportionately."
	It remains unclear exactly how many small sellers would actually convert to getting a firearms licence. The cost and inconvenience could be disproportionate, and again, business as well as sport could suffer.
	The more important point for the Minister to show is exactly how that will reduce violent crime involving air weapons. While the clause will make it more difficult for lawful users to acquire air weapons, there is no evidence that that will affect the level of misuse.

Hazel Blears: No. We have heard a lot tonight about legitimate shooting and I have no doubt that there are legitimate shooters who act responsibly, but the Bill's purpose is to deal with people who use weapons irresponsibly, just as its purpose is to deal with those who use alcohol irresponsibly. It is about directing our action at the mischief that undoubtedly is caused in our communities. If the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) represented a slightly different area, he would know that older people, in particular, have been plagued by the misuse of air weapons. Various members of the Committee, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Brent, South (Ms Butler), pointed out that some older people are cowering in their homes because people are taking pot-shots at them and their families. So I make no apologies for trying to ensure that sufficient restrictions are in place.
	Amendment No. 108 would remove the requirement for air weapon retailers to keep a register of transactions, but that register is an important part of the controls. It removes purchasers' anonymity and should deter casual and irresponsible sales, which is what we want to achieve. At the moment, people can buy air weapons at car boot sales, through mail order and on the internet. Requiring that a register be kept and that air weapons be sold face to face brings a little more rigor to the system. I do not pretend for a moment that we are introducing a licensing system for the millions of air weapons in existence, but we are doing what we can, in a practical and proportionate way, to ensure that the sale of air weapons is at least a little safer. I realise that the licensing fee is £150, but that is for three years, so it is not an onerous requirement for those stores and shops that want to be responsible air weapon retailers. I am sure that many of them will be delighted to register with their local police force to enable them to sell their weapons properly.
	Amendment No. 109 would modify the requirement in clause 28 by applying it only to air weapons with a muzzle energy in excess of 1 J, but such weapons are already included. I discovered in Committee that weapons of 1 J or greater are the only ones that meet the firearms definition of a lethal barrelled weapon in the Firearms Act 1968. Lethality does not occur until a muzzle energy in excess of 1 J is reached, so a weapon with a muzzle energy of less than 1 J is not a lethal barrelled weapon and does not fall within the definition of a firearm. It is very strange for me to be telling the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly), an avowed shooter and an expert on the technicalities of such matters, that his amendment is therefore superfluous; nevertheless, I ask him to withdraw it.
	Amendment No. 110 would remove from the Bill the increase in the age limit. It is right and proper that we bring the air weapons provision into line with that for knives, because we want to ensure that young people have access to potentially dangerous weapons only in the proper circumstances. Young people will still be able to shoot at approved clubs under adult supervision, or, if they are aged 14 or over, on private premises with the occupier's consent. That gives them sufficient ability to shoot under proper conditions.
	I am glad that Government amendments Nos. 46, 47 and 48 have been welcomed by the Opposition. They clarify the situation in cases where people fire an air weapon beyond the boundary of one premises and into another, with consent.
	Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Amendment proposed: No. 110, in page 30, line 24, leave out clause 29.—[Mr. Djanogly.]

Question accordingly negatived.
	Mr. Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.
	Remaining Government amendments agreed to.
	Order for Third Reading read.

Hazel Blears: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
	I am grateful to Members on both sides of the House for their constructive approach during consideration of the Bill in Committee and on Report. Many helpful points, including points of clarification, were raised in Committee, which have enabled us to make more explicit the intention of the Bill and to improve it. I thank the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle (Mr. Benton) for their excellent chairmanship of our discussions.
	I also thank the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (John Thurso), who is not in the Chamber. I learned more about the Atholl Highlanders during the proceedings of the Bill than I could ever have contemplated. I also know more about managing a rural estate, which is how the hon. Gentleman seems to spend some of his time. The Committee stage was extremely good-natured.
	I hope that Members will agree that we responded positively to many of the points raised and that the Bill we are sending to the other place has been significantly improved by the scrutiny process. I welcome the broad measure of cross-party support for many of the provisions. In Committee, we shared the desire to tackle gun and knife crime and to try to reduce the unacceptable, alcohol-fuelled violence and disorder, which we unfortunately see on too many of the streets of our towns and cities, to protect the decent, law-abiding majority of people.
	The British crime survey data show considerable falls in violent crime since 1997—a total fall of 34 per cent., which is significant by anybody's reckoning—but we are not complacent, nor would the public want us to be. Too many people are still victims of crime, including violent crime. Too many people live in fear of crime and we need to tackle that, too. We are doing everything we can to try to make a real difference and the Bill contains a good cross-section of provisions, giving the police and local communities the powers they need further to reduce violent crime, particularly in relation to knives, guns and alcohol.
	Although most people drink responsibly, we all agree that the scale of alcohol-fuelled violence is too high. I believe that responsibility for ending the binge-drinking culture rests both with individuals, because it is important that they make correct choices about drinking, and with the people who run pubs, clubs, supermarkets and off-licences. I realise that the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) wanted to make a distinction between on and off-licence premises in terms of responsibility, but I reject such a distinction. If Members consider the results of the recent test purchasing in off-licence premises, they will see that there is still a significant problem of such premises selling to under-age youngsters. It is not simply a problem for the on-licence trade. Everybody has to take responsibility and the alcohol disorder zone provisions are about ensuring that collective responsibility.
	We debated drinking banning orders at some length. I hope that Members will accept the difference between drinking banning orders and ASBOs, although I do not have a great deal of real hope in the case of the hon. Member for Woking. There is a significant difference. We want the orders to be used proactively by the courts whenever people come before them.
	There is a series of exceptions to the drinking banning order, because we want to ensure that people can access their home, education and place of work, even when they are under a drinking banning order. We also said that people should still be able to attend their place of worship. That could help them to desist from the demon drink, so it will certainly be included as part of the guidance.
	We debated alcohol disorder zones again today. The Bill tries to build on the efforts already made by responsible licensees. My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (David Lepper) referred to business improvement districts. We talked about the city safe scheme in Manchester and similar schemes in Swansea, Leicester, Cardiff and York, where licensees are working voluntarily with their police and local councils to tackle the problems.
	Members have expressed concerns that good operators will be caught with the bad ones. The hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) put the point extremely well: everybody is culpable but there should be differentiation in the degree of culpability. We shall try to achieve that in the regulations.
	I am disappointed that the Liberal Democrats have continually moved amendments that—in the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble)—would ensure that the provision for alcohol disorders was unworkable. We should be honest enough to say either that we support the principle of such zones and ensure that we have practical, effective legislation or that we do not support such zones and would do away with them. What causes me immense frustration is that, time and again, the Liberal Democrats will the ends but not the means.
	The Liberal Democrats say that they are against antisocial behaviour, but they will not support ASBOs. They say that they are against gangs hanging around, but they will not support dispersal orders. They say that they want to tackle alcohol-fuelled violence, but are not prepared to support alcohol disorder zones. In politics, it is very important that we are very clear about what action we want to take. Theirs is a party that has not been in government and is not likely to be in government. It simply wills the ends but not the means to get there. Sometimes, government is about making some pretty hard decisions.

DELEGATED LEGISLATION

Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 118(6)(Standing Committees on Delegated Legislation),

EUROPEAN DOCUMENTS

Alison Seabeck: The hon. Lady is right to speak of the disproportionate effects of water bills on low-income pensioners. According to the Department for Work and Pensions, a quarter of a million children across the south-west are living in households in the bottom quintile of income distribution. If we are to address pensioner and child poverty, we must find a means of mitigating the effects of water charges, particularly in our region. I hope that the hon. Lady welcomes the proposed south-west affordability pilot, which may provide information enabling us to deal with part of the problem.

Andrew George: My hon. Friend is well aware that all the regulations that the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Steen) mentioned were already well telegraphed by the time that privatisation was well under way. Does she agree that the proposed pilot for 2006 has not even reached its scoping level and will benefit only up to 1,000 out of 600,000 households in the south-west?

Elliot Morley: Far be it from me to lay the blame on previous Conservative Governments; I am simply painting the background to the existing problems and describing their root. However, I will certainly touch on potential solutions.
	I should point out to the hon. Member for Falmouth and Camborne that there are no easy answers to this problem, and one reason why is that the companies involved are private companies. I take it that the hon. Member for Windsor is not suggesting that we provide public subsidies for private companies, because that does not quite go with Conservative philosophy. It should not be forgotten that during the previous price round, the regulator, rightly or wrongly, cut bills by an average of just over 10 per cent. Although prices will rise between now and this time next year, which will affect customers in the south-west, in real terms they will still be paying less than they did in 1999. In 2006, the average bill will still be 2 per cent. lower, in real terms, than it was in 1999. These are nevertheless average prices, and such prices can mask disproportionate effects upon individuals. I am not being complacent about that. It is also fair to point out that the number of pensioners in relative poverty in the south-west fell by about a quarter between 1996–97 and 2002–03, from 270,000 to 210,000. It is true that pensioners' incomes in the south-west are marginally lower than those in Great Britain as a whole, but they are higher in all regions outside London, the south-east and the east. Pensioners' incomes have risen faster than earnings over the past nine years.
	In the country as a whole, pensioners' incomes have risen by 27 per cent., compared with 15 per cent. for wages, as a result of uprating the basic state pension in line with inflation, or by 2.5 per cent. each year, in uprating the guaranteed credit element of the pension credit in line with earnings so that the poorest pensioners will see year-on-year increases in income that are greater than inflation.
	I stress these points because one of the ways in which the Government have approached the issue has been to tackle low incomes generally. That is a powerful argument. There are many different mechanisms in respect of utility prices, but low incomes are key to the problem. Affordability is also a key point. That problem applies throughout the country. There are certain improvements in the south-west that are dedicated to the area, including, in particular, water coloration and drinking water quality. There is also the issue of connecting homes to mains sewerage, which is a particular problem in the south-west. I understand that the current price round is designed to connect 261 properties to the mains, which is quite a lot. It is designed also to address sewer flooding, which is a problem in parts of the south-west, as it is in other parts of the country.
	It would be wrong to think that the costs that fall upon south-west consumers are for the benefits of other people. Many of the costs are for the benefit of south-west customers and consumers. However, I recognise the point that the hon. Lady is making.